May’s B-side contents are:

• The Drone War by PETER BERGEN & KATHERINE TIEDEMANN
• Taliban vs Taliban by GRAHAM USHER
• How Pakistan is Countering the Taliban by HUSAIN HAQQANI

Drone, drone and drones, droning on about drones regrettably is a pastime in Pakistan now, so its time to talk drones!

The Drone War by Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann

The Al Qaeda videotape shows a small white dog tied up inside a glass cage. A milky gas slowly filters in. An Arab man with an Egyptian accent says: “Start counting the time.” Nervous, the dog starts barking and then moaning. After flailing about for some minutes, it succumbs to the poisonous gas and stops moving.

This experiment almost certainly occurred at the Derunta training camp near the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, conducted by an Egyptian with the nom de jihad of “Abu Khabab.” In the late 1990s, under the direction of Al Qaeda’s number two, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Abu Khabab set up the terrorist group’s WMD research program, which was given the innocuous codename “Yogurt.” Abu Khabab taught hundreds of militants how to deploy poisonous chemicals, such as ricin and cyanide gas. The Egyptian WMD expert also explored the possible uses of radioactive materials, writing in a 2001 memo to his superiors, “As you instructed us you will find attached a summary of the discharges from a traditional nuclear reactor, among which are radioactive elements that could be used for military operations.” In the memo, Abu Khabab asked if it were possible to get more information about the matter “from our Pakistani friends who have great experience in this sphere.” This was likely a reference to the retired Pakistani senior nuclear scientists who were meeting then with Osama bin Laden.

In the pandemonium following the fall of the Taliban in the winter of 2001, Abu Khabab disappeared into the badlands on the Afghan-Pakistani border. The United States put a $5 million bounty on his head and, in January 2006, attempted to kill him and Zawahiri while they were believed to be in the Pakistani hamlet of Damadola, targeting them with a missile launched by a drone aircraft.

Initial press reports said that Abu Khabab was killed in the strike, but, when the dust cleared, 25 civilians, including a half-dozen kids, were dead–and Abu Khabab was not among them. Unsurprisingly, the civilian death toll sparked protests in the region. In one, several thousand tribesmen chanted “Death to America,” and the issue of innocents killed by U.S. rockets quickly became a potent Pakistani Taliban propaganda point. A couple of weeks after the botched missile strike, Zawahiri himself appeared in a videotape, saying that the Damadola strike was a “failure” and taunting President Bush as a “butcher.”

More than two years later, on July 28, 2008, a U.S. drone finally killed Abu Khabab in the Pakistani tribal region of South Waziristan (along with two other militants and three boys who happened to be in the strike zone). The assassination of the WMD expert marked the beginning of a vastly ramped-up program to take out Al Qaeda’s leaders using missiles launched by U.S. drones. President Obama has not only continued the drone program, he has ratcheted it up further. In 2007, there were three drone strikes in Pakistan; in 2008, there were 34; and, in the first months of 2009, the Obama administration has already authorized 16.

The drone war against Al Qaeda’s leaders–and, increasingly, their Pakistani-based Taliban allies–has been waged with little public discussion or congressional investigation of its legality or efficacy, even though the offensive is essentially a program of assassination that kills not only militant leaders, but also civilians in a country that is, at least nominally, a close ally of the United States. Nor has there been a substantive debate about whether the gains of winnowing the ranks of Al Qaeda’s leadership outweigh the fact that the inevitable civilian casualties are a superb recruiting tool for the Pakistani Taliban. Indeed, the drone strikes have pushed militants deeper into Pakistan and given them an excuse to strike the heartland of the country, further destabilizing the already rickety government in Islamabad. All of which raises the question of whether the drone campaign, however useful in the short term, might fatally undermine U.S. efforts to stabilize the region and to win the long-term war against Al Qaeda and its allies.
***

Officially, the United States does not assassinate people. In the aftermath of the Church Committee investigations–which uncovered eight plots to kill Fidel Castro–Presidents Ford and Carter both signed executive orders banning assassinations. In practice, however, presidents have signed off on missions to kill political leaders who have ordered attacks on Americans. Ronald Reagan authorized air strikes on one of Muammar Qaddafi’s residences in 1986, after Libyan agents bombed a German bar frequented by U.S. military personnel. And President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack on an Al Qaeda camp after learning that the terrorist network was responsible for the 1998 bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Legally, successive administrations have justified these exceptions by arguing that the assassination ban does not apply to enemy commanders. Under this interpretation, Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders are fair game. President Bush authorized several targeted killings in the first years after the September 11 attacks. In November 2001, a drone strike near Kabul killed Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda’s military commander. Atef, whose daughter married one of Osama bin Laden’s sons, was a close confidante of the Al Qaeda leader. A year later, one of the suspected planners of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, Abu Ali Al Harethi, was killed by a drone in Yemen–the first such strike outside of Afghanistan. Also killed in the attack was Kamal Derwish, an American in cahoots with Al Qaeda and the first U.S. citizen to die in a CIA drone strike.

The relatively slow pace of drone attacks against Al Qaeda’s leaders quickened dramatically in the waning months of the Bush administration after it had become clear that the terror group was reconstituting itself in Pakistan’s tribal regions. In July 2007, the 16 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community released a National Intelligence Estimate assessing that Al Qaeda was resurging and warning that it “has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).”

What particularly alarmed Bush administration officials was the mounting evidence that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups were using the FATA to train Westerners for attacks on American and European targets. For instance, the masterminds of the July 7, 2005, attacks in London, which killed 52 people, had trained in the tribal regions. So too had the leaders of the summer 2006 plot to use liquid explosives to bring down seven Canadian and U.S. passenger jets leaving Heathrow. Two Germans and one Turk who were planning to bomb the U.S. Air Force base in Ramstein, Germany in 2007 had trained with an Al Qaeda affiliate in the tribal areas. And, during this period, both bin Laden and Zawahiri, who are generally presumed to be living in or around the FATA, continued to release a stream of audio- and videotapes demonstrating that the Al Qaeda leadership was very much intact.

At the same time, despite “peace agreements” that the Pakistani government had negotiated with the Taliban in 2005 and 2006, the number of attacks into Afghanistan by militants crossing the border was increasing exponentially. And the violence from the FATA-based groups began blowing back into Pakistan itself. More Pakistani citizens died in militant violence in 2007 than had died in the six previous years combined.

By early 2008, the Bush administration had tired of the Pakistani government’s unwillingness or inability to take out the militants in the FATA, and in July the president authorized Special Operations forces to carry out ground assaults in the tribal regions without the prior permission of the Pakistani government. On September 3, 2008, a team of Navy SEALS based in Afghanistan crossed the Pakistani border into South Waziristan to attack a compound housing militants. Twenty of the occupants were killed, most of them women and children. The Pakistani press picked up on the attack, and the assault sparked vehement objections from Pakistani officials, who protested that it violated their national sovereignty. Army chief of staff Afshaq Parvez Kayani bluntly said that Pakistan’s “territorial integrity … will be defended at all costs,” suggesting that any future insertion of American soldiers into Pakistan would be met by force.

In the face of the intense Pakistani opposition to American boots on the ground, the Bush administration chose to rely on drones to target suspected militants. Bush ordered the CIA to expand its attacks with Predator and Reaper drones, and, according to a former Bush administration official familiar with the program, the U.S. government stopped notifying Pakistani officials when strikes were imminent or obtaining their “concurrence” for the attacks. As a result, the time that it took for a target to be identified and engaged dropped from many hours to 45 minutes.

The Predators and Reapers are operated by a squadron of pilots stationed in Nevada and are equipped to drop Hellfire missiles and JDAM bombs, respectively. More than two-dozen feet in length, the drones linger over the tribal areas looking for targets. Between July 2008 and the time he left office, President Bush authorized 30 Predator and Reaper strikes on Pakistani territory, compared to the six strikes that the CIA had launched during the first half of the year, a fivefold increase.

The Taliban consistently have claimed that those killed in the attacks are civilians, while U.S. and Pakistani officials generally say that they are militants. The truth is, of course, a mix of both, but it’s impossible to give an accurate breakdown of the death toll because the militants live among the civilian population and don’t wear uniforms. Based on our analysis of reliable accounts in the Pakistani and U.S. press, the drone attacks have killed around 600 militants and civilians since 2006, two-thirds of them in the past two years. This figure is roughly the same as the number that Amir Mir, a well-regarded Pakistani terrorism expert, arrived at for the same time period. Mir puts the total number of deaths caused by drone attacks during the past three-and-half years at 700, although he asserts that the vast majority of casualties have been civilians, something that is, in fact, impossible to establish definitively.

It is possible to say with some certainty that since the summer of 2008 U.S. drones have killed dozens of lower-ranking militants and at least ten mid-and upper-level leaders within Al Qaeda or the Taliban. One of them was Abu Laith Al Libi, who orchestrated a 2007 suicide attack targeting Vice President Dick Cheney while he was visiting Bagram air base in Afghanistan. Al Libi was then described as the number-three man in the Al Qaeda hierarchy, perhaps the most dangerous job in the world, given that the half-dozen or so men who have occupied that position have ended up dead or in prison.

Other leading militants killed in the drone strikes include Abu Sulayman Al Jazairi, an Algerian jihadist; Abu Khabab, the WMD expert; Abdul Rehman, a Taliban commander in South Waziristan; Abu Haris, Al Qaeda’s chief in Pakistan; Khalid Habib, Abu Zubair Al Masri, and Abdullah Azzam Al Saudi, all of whom were senior members of Al Qaeda; Abu Jihad Al Masri, Al Qaeda’s propaganda chief; and Rashid Rauf, a British national who is a key suspect in the 2006 plot to bring down U.S. and Canadian airliners (though there is some debate about whether Rauf is actually dead).

One consistent target of the drone attacks has been the South Waziristan strongholds of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban. American and Pakistani officials identify Mehsud as the mastermind of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in December 2007. So far, Mehsud has managed to evade death. None of the strikes has targeted bin Laden, who seems to have vanished like a wraith.

The pace of drone attacks increased further during the waning days of the Bush administration–likely a legacy-building effort to dismantle the entire Al Qaeda top leadership. Cheney seemed to acknowledge this in an interview with CNN eleven days before Obama took office, saying optimistically of efforts to kill bin Laden, “We’ve got a few days left yet.” A week earlier, the Bush administration had received the welcome news that Osama Al Kini and his lieutenant, Sheik Ahmed Salim Swedan, had been killed by a Hellfire missile launched from a drone over Waziristan. Al Kini and Swedan played a central role in planning the 1998 bombings of the two American embassies in East Africa. In one of his many exit interviews, Bush told Larry King with a slight smirk that bin Laden would eventually be found “just like the people who allegedly were involved in the East African bombings. Couple of them were brought to justice recently.”

Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations have been leery of discussing the highly classified drone program on the record, but a window into their thinking was provided by the remarks of then-CIA director Michael Hayden on November 13, 2008, as the drone program was in full swing. “By making a safe haven feel less safe, we keep Al Qaeda guessing.We make them doubt their allies; question their methods, their plans, even their priorities,” he explained. Hayden went on to say that the key outcome of the drone attacks was that”we force them to spend more time and resources on self-preservation, and that distracts them, at least partially and at least for a time, from laying the groundwork for the next attack.”

This strategy seems to have worked, at least in terms of the ability of Al Qaeda and other FATA-based militant groups to plan or carry out attacks in the West. Since the summer of 2008, law-enforcement authorities have uncovered no serious plots against U.S. or European targets that have been traceable back to Pakistan’s tribal regions.

Privately, American officials rave about the drone program. One former Bush administration official said that the drones had so crimped the militants’ activities in FATA that they had begun discussing a move to Yemen or Somalia. Two officials familiar with the drone program point out that the number of “spies” Al Qaeda and the Taliban have killed has risen dramatically in the past year, suggesting that the militants are turning on themselves in an effort to root out the sources of the often pinpoint intelligence that has led to what those officials describe as the deaths of half of the top militant leaders in the FATA.

Daniel Byman, who runs the Security Studies program at Georgetown, has studied the effects that targeted assassinations have on terrorist groups. For years, the Israeli government has mounted assassinations against the leaders of groups like Hamas. Byman found that the dead leaders were replaced by more junior members of the group, “who are not as good; you drive down the age and experience of the leadership.” A similar problem appears to be affecting Al Qaeda, according to Dennis Blair, the Director of National Intelligence. In February, he testified to Congress that “replacing the loss of key leaders, since 2008, in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas has proved difficult for Al Qaeda.”

One way of measuring the pain that the drone program has inflicted on Al Qaeda is the number of audio-and videotapes that the terrorist group has released through its propaganda arm, As Sahab (“the clouds” in Arabic). Al Qaeda takes its propaganda operations seriously; bin Laden has observed that 90 percent of his battle is waged in the media, and Zawahiri has made similar comments. In 2007, As Sahab had a banner year, releasing almost 100 tapes. But the number of releases dropped by half in 2008, indicating that the group’s leaders were more concerned with survival than public relations. However, since the beginning of 2009, Al Qaeda is on track to produce a record number of tapes, suggesting that its media arm has moved from the FATA deeper into Pakistan, likely to cities such as Peshawar.

Such a move would be something of a reverse migration. Between 2002 and 2004, Al Qaeda leaders generally preferred the perceived safety of Pakistan’s teeming, anonymous cities. In fact, typical urban activities like making cell phone calls or dialing up Internet connections provided many important clues to the whereabouts of Al Qaeda operatives, according to Pakistani intelligence officials. As a result, in the first three years after September 11, key Al Qaeda operatives were captured in cities such as Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, Faisalabad, Gujrat, and Rawalpindi. Following those arrests, the Al Qaeda leadership largely migrated to the relative safe haven of FATA. Now that haven is safe no more.
***

While there is little doubt that the strikes have disrupted Al Qaeda’s operations, the larger question is to what extent they may have increased the appeal of militant groups and undermined the fragile Pakistani state. Such an outcome would be ultimately a lot more worrisome than anything that could happen in Afghanistan, given that Pakistan has dozens of nuclear weapons and will soon be the fifth most populous country in the world. A militantly anti-American Pakistan would be a major strategic problem for the United States and the West in general.

There is little doubt that the drone program is deeply unpopular among Pakistanis, who see it as an infringement on their sovereignty and who are, in any case, generally anti-American. Today, the United States is viewed favorably by fewer than one in five Pakistanis, and a poll released last year found that 52 percent of respondents blamed the United States for the violence in their country, while only 8 percent blamed Al Qaeda. The militants have actually used the drone attacks as an excuse to strike the Punjabi heartland of the country. In taking credit for the March attack on a Lahore police academy that killed 18 people, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, said it was “in retaliation for the continued drone strikes by the U.S. in collaboration with Pakistan on our people.”

The one place the drone strikes do seem popular is in the FATA itself. The Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy, a Pakistani think tank that does work in the tribal regions, found that more than half the people it polled in the FATA say the drone strikes are accurate and are damaging the militant organizations. Fewer than half said that anti-American sentiment in the area had increased due to the drone attacks. This is perhaps less surprising than it might initially seem; if a bunch of heavily armed religious nutcases took over your neighborhood, you too might not mind if occasionally they were whacked by mysterious missiles falling from the sky, whatever their provenance.

Pakistani officials, however, conscious of how unpopular the drone attacks are among the general population, have been at pains to distance themselves from them. In New York last November, President Asif Ali Zardari protested, “It’s undermining my sovereignty, and it’s not helping win the war on the hearts and minds of people.” And, in January, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani told CNN that there was no agreement between his government and the Americans to allow the strikes. The next month, though, Senator Dianne Feinstein, who is privy to the most sensitive briefings as head of the intelligence committee, inadvertently let the inconvenient truth out of the bag when she said of the drones, “As I understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base.”

For Pakistani politicians, the drone program is a dream come true. They get to posture to their constituents about the perfidious Americans even as they reap the benefits from the U.S. strikes. They are well-aware that neither the Pakistani Army’s ineffective military operations nor the various peace agreements with the militants have done anything to halt the steady Talibanization of their country, while the U.S. drones are the one surefire way to put significant pressure on the leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This is called getting to have your chapati and eat it too.
***

Just three days into his presidency, Obama authorized a near-simultaneous pair of drone strikes against targets in North and South Waziristan. Since he took office, there have been a total of 16 airstrikes, or roughly one per week. Our analysis shows that these attacks have killed some 170 people, but only one has killed an important Al Qaeda or Taliban leader, presumably because many of them have decamped from the tribal areas. The ramped-up drone program seems to have hit the point of diminishing returns.

There has been some speculation in the press that the CIA might extend the drone attacks to other parts of Pakistan, in particular the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan where the Afghan Taliban is headquartered, but this seems unlikely. The western tribal regions, which have lived under their own legal and social codes for centuries, have never fully been part of Pakistan proper. In fact, the Urdu word for the tribal regions is ilaqa ghair, or “foreign area.” By contrast, Baluchistan is part and parcel of the Pakistani state. U.S. drone attacks there would almost certainly provoke the same fierce Pakistani pushback that the SEALS’ ground incursion into the tribal regions did last year. Shuja Nawaz, the author of Crossed Swords, the authoritative history of the Pakistani military, says, “Any drone attack in provinces outside of the tribal regions would be disastrous, totally destroying the American relationship with the army.”

There is widespread consensus among national security experts that the drone program is the least bad available option to pressure the Al Qaeda leadership and its Taliban allies. This is because the Pakistani government–divided between a barely functional civilian arm and a strong but unelected army–has wavered between ineffective punitive expeditions against the extremists and appeasement. Neither the military nor the political establishment has articulated an effective plan to rid the country of its jihadist militants. And so, for the moment, the drones are the only game in town.

But the drone program is a tactic, not a strategy. Bruce Hoffman, a professor at Georgetown widely regarded as the dean of terrorism studies, says, “We are deluding ourselves if we think in and of itself the drone program is going to be the answer,” pointing out that the 2006 U.S. airstrike which killed the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, did not exactly shut down the organization. Following Zarqawi’s death, violence in Iraq actually accelerated.

And militant organizations like Al Qaeda are not like an organized crime family, which can be put out of business if most or all of the members of the family are captured or killed. Al Qaeda has sustained and can continue to sustain enormous blows that would put other organizations out of business because the members of the group firmly believe that they are doing God’s work.

Effectively challenging the militants will require a sea change in the views of Pakistani citizens and their leaders, who have been conditioned by decades of war and tension with India to believe that the real danger lies to their east instead of their west. Fortunately, if there is a silver lining to the militant atrocities that have plagued Pakistan in the past year and a half, it may be that such a change has begun. The Taliban’s assassination of Benazir Bhutto; Al Qaeda’s bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad; the attack on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore; the widely circulated video images of the Taliban flogging a 17-year-old girl; a cell phone video recording of militants executing a couple for supposed adultery–each of these has provoked real revulsion among the Pakistani public, which is, in the main, utterly opposed to the militants.

In fact, future historians may record the Taliban’s decision to move from the Swat Valley into Buner District, only 60 miles from Islamabad, as the tipping point that finally galvanized the sclerotic Pakistani state to confront the fact that the jihadist monster it had spawned was now trying to swallow its creator. Indeed, lost in all the disturbing pictures of the Taliban advancing on Islamabad are three seismic shifts in the Pakistani political landscape whose importance is rarely discussed today in the U.S. press. First is the lawyers’ movement, which lies outside of the control of Pakistan’s traditional hidebound party system and was instrumental in pushing dictator General Pervez Musharraf out of power last year. Second is the explosion in independent Pakistani TV stations, which are largely pro-democratic and secular. Third, the alliance of pro-Taliban religious parties known as the MMA was trounced in the 2008 election, earning a miserable 2 percent of the vote, while support for suicide bombing among Pakistanis has plummeted from 33 percent in 2002 to 5 percent in 2008.

Although the political will necessary to wipe out the Taliban is beginning to emerge in both the public and the political establishment, the Pakistani army remains mired in conventional approaches to this unconventional conflict. The fact that hundreds of thousands of refugees have streamed out of Buner and Swat as the army engages the Taliban with artillery and air power indicates that the Pakistani military still lacks the capability and doctrine for successful counterinsurgency operations. Until that changes, U.S. drone operations will likely continue in Pakistan for the foreseeable future because building the capacity for robust counterinsurgency operations takes years, as the U.S. military found to its cost in Iraq. In the meantime, the civilized world can take solace in the fact that Abu Khabab and some of his peers are no longer with us.

Published in The New Republic

WASIM VIEW- Peter Bergen is the famed ‘terrorism expert’ of CNN and is respected in his field.  I must begin by saying that Bergen & Tiedemann’s article is compulsory reading for it charts the history of drone attacks in Pakistan.

Moreover, the article serves as  incriminating evidence against the Mush/Bush tag team and worse the present Obama/Zardari tag team who have presided over the betryal of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Indeed Bergen’s math says it all  when he diclosed that the US sanctioned 3 drone attacks in  2007 but 34 in 2008 . Yet in the first few months of 2009, the Obama administration has already authorized 16 drone attacks. Hail change we cant Obama I say!

My biggest moan (and possibly too for another 170 million Pakistanis) is that drone attacks are illegal and are a naked aggression against the Pakistani state. Worse still, the Predators or presents are gifts of  our so-called ally in Uncle Sam and proves that even under the saviour of the world President Obama both Obama and America have learnt nothing. To some extent, Bergen agrees I feel as the article comments that the drone war has ‘been waged with little public discussion or congressional investigation of its legality or efficacy, even though the offensive is essentially a program of assassination that kills not only militant leaders, but also civilians in a country that is, at least nominally, a close ally of the United States’

Looking at the issue in pure military terms, I agree with Bergen that drone attacks have killed many leading lights of Al-Qaeda, however I see them as counterproductive with a capital C. Drone attacks kill today’s terrorists but create many more for tomorrow and serve as a recruiting tool for Al-Qaeda. Drone attacks also fuel anti-US sentiment and worse create a wedge between the moderate majority and the religious right who revel in ridiculing this facet of US-Pakistan relations a la not so friendly fire actions.

To end, I agree with Bergen that drone attacks are here to stay even though they are not welcome or effective. However since the Pakistani government has tacitly agreed to their use (indeed they fly from Balochistan) it seems we will see more drones droning on and on. My quarrel is not just with the US but more so with my own government who have tried to pull a fast one on their public by  feigning ignorance when Mrs Hellfire lets out some fire in FATA, it is as Bergen says getting to have your chapati and eat it too.

Next the sons of satan that are the Taliban and their various forms are considered within the broader geopolitical context  thanks to an informative article by Graham Usher.

Taliban vs Taliban by Graham Usher

Pakistan and India have been at war since 1948. There have been occasional flare-ups, pitched battles between the two armies, but mostly the war has taken the form of a guerrilla battle between the Indian army and Pakistani surrogates in Kashmir. In 2004 the two countries began a cautious peace process, but rather than ending, the war has since migrated to Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal areas on the Afghan border. ‘Safe havens’ for a reinvigorated Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida, the tribal areas are seen by the West as the ‘greatest threat’ to its security, as well as being the main cause of Western frustration with Pakistan. The reason is simple: the Pakistan army’s counterinsurgency strategy is not principally directed at the Taliban or even al-Qaida: the main enemy is India.

In the Bajaur tribal area, for example, the army is fighting an insurgency led by Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of one of Pakistan’s three Taliban factions, but it’s not because he is a friend of al-Qaida. What makes him a threat, in the eyes of Pakistan’s army, is that he is believed to be responsible for scores of suicide attacks inside Pakistan (including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto). He is also thought to have recruited hundreds of Afghan fighters, among them ‘agents’ from the Afghan and Indian intelligence services – ‘Pakistan’s enemies’, in the words of a senior officer.

An enemy in Bajaur, the Taliban is a friend of Pakistan in North and South Waziristan. Like Mehsud, the guerrilla commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, who directs the Afghan Taliban’s ‘central front’ from bases in Pashtun villages in Pakistan, has ties to al-Qaida. Unlike Mehsud, he’s not attacking Pakistan, and his fight against the US and Nato enjoys the support of the army and of broad sections of the Pakistani public. The same courtesy has been extended to Mullah Omar, whose headquarters are in Quetta, where he’s reportedly sheltered by the ISI. ‘They are our people; they’re not our enemies,’ one ISI officer says. So what does it mean to be ‘anti-Pakistan’? The short answer is pro-India, in practice if not intent. Insurgents in the tribal areas are deemed anti-Pakistani if their actions advance the perceived goals of India in Afghanistan. They are pro-Pakistani as long as they don’t attack the Pakistani state or army, even if they launch attacks against Nato forces in Afghanistan, Islamabad’s supposed allies in the ‘war on terror’. Indeed, the Afghan Taliban is considered an ‘asset’, a hedge against the day when the US and Nato leave, but also a counter to India’s expanding influence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been worried by India’s increasing interest in Afghanistan since the Bonn conference in November 2001 at which Afghan factional leaders and UN officials met to discuss the formation of a post-Taliban government. At that conference it became clear that the pro-Pakistani Afghan Taliban would be purged from the new Afghanistan under Karzai and replaced by forces dominated by commanders from the Northern Alliance (NA), which had opposed the Taliban regime before 9/11 and fought with US troops to overthrow it. India, Iran and Russia were the NA’s main supporters while Islamabad was backing the Taliban. Neither Pakistan nor the Taliban was invited to Bonn – this was ‘the original sin’, according to Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN representative.

India is one of Karzai’s few remaining champions. Delhi sees the new Afghanistan as a part of its sphere of influence. It has four consulates in Afghanistan and has given its government $1.2 billion in aid: a remarkable sum for it to donate to a country that is 99 per cent Muslim and with which it has no common border. Delhi has also put up the new parliament building and chancery, and has helped to train the army. India’s most ambitious – and, for Pakistan, most alarming – Afghan project is a new highway that will provide a route to the Iranian port of Chabahar. Not only will Afghanistan no longer need to use Pakistani ports, the road’s destination is a clear indication of India’s intention to consolidate an alliance with Iran in western Afghanistan in order to counter Pakistan’s influence in eastern Afghanistan. The road network, as they see it, is a new way to fight an old war. It’s precisely in order to resist the India-Iran bloc – as well as the emerging axis between Delhi and Washington – that the ISI has aligned itself with the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani.

Washington has tilted towards Delhi since 2004, lured by the size of India’s markets and its potential as strategic counterweight to China, Pakistan’s closest regional ally. Last year the US signed an agreement that allows India to buy civilian atomic technology, including nuclear fuel, from American firms, even though it is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan, by contrast, has been criticised for developing a nuclear weapon, and of course for the activities of its former top nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan.

Since 9/11 Washington has tended to use Islamabad as a gun for hire: the army was given around $1 billion a year on condition that it secured supplies to US and Nato forces in Afghanistan and fought against the Taliban and al-Qaida in the tribal areas. In agreeing this condition Pakistan had expected that its interests would be taken into account following the Anglo-American invasion. But unlike India or Iran, and despite its services to Washington, Islamabad was given no say in the formation of the Afghan government. This confirmed Pakistanis in their view that Musharraf and his army were no better than mercenaries fighting ‘America’s war’, and as a result of this humiliation, the Pakistani army has interpreted its commitments selectively, opposing ‘safe havens’ that might be used to launch attacks against other countries, but supporting the Afghan Taliban insurgency. Washington is exasperated by Pakistan’s refusal to fight the Taliban, but it’s been given little incentive to do so.

Fear of India’s influence was heightened by Bush’s decree last July allowing US Special Forces in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaida and Taliban fugitives into Pakistan’s territory without the approval of its government. There has been one US ground assault and more than 30 drone attacks since then, overwhelmingly in North and South Waziristan. Washington claims to have a tacit agreement about the drone strikes with the Pakistan government. The government denies this. Army officers admit that the strikes may have killed scores of al-Qaida fighters, and that the ISI may have supplied intelligence for the operations, but the missiles have also killed civilians, including pro-government tribal elders.

The Pakistan army believes India is responsible for the CIA’s new belligerence. Some even believe India wants to create such turmoil in the tribal areas that Nato forces and the new Afghan army are compelled to invade, destroy the ‘terrorist havens’, and wrest back Pashtun lands claimed by Kabul. Others think that India wants to dismember Pakistan because of the ‘danger’ it poses as the world’s only Muslim nuclear state. According to another source in the army, ‘the Americans have decided India will be the regional power. And India thinks a fragmented Pakistan would reduce the threat level.’ It’s true that Washington’s nightmare is Pakistan’s nuclear materials falling into the hands of al-Qaida militants. Indeed war games have been staged in the Pentagon to work out what kind of military intervention would be needed to rescue them. The ISI’s charge that there is Indian involvement in the unrest in the tribal areas is unconvincing, and the evidence scant, but it’s safe to assume that India is keeping a close eye on what’s going on there.

After the Mumbai attacks in November a senior Indian military officer told journalists in Delhi that the US-led fight on the Pakistan-Afghan border was ‘also our war’. And a former Indian envoy to Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy, told India Today magazine in January that India ‘should not shy away from political destabilisation and inflicting economic damage on Pakistan. The time has come for us to say that Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan is disputed.’ It does not bode well. ‘The more I talk to the military establishment, the more I’m convinced fear and hatred of India is growing,’ a Pakistan security analyst told me.

America has just unveiled a strategic review of its policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan and the tribal areas. While civilian aid to the Pakistan government will increase, Obama will continue with certain policies from the Bush era. One is the use of military force. There will be more drone attacks in the tribal areas (at least 80 people have been killed by US missiles since January) and perhaps in Balochistan, and a ‘surge’ of 21,000 US troops in Afghanistan, mostly along the border with Pakistan. Obama has also promised that US policy towards India – and Kashmir in particular – will be ‘dehyphenated’ from policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan.

One consequence is that three feuding Taliban factions have now joined forces against ‘Obama, Zardari and Karzai’ in an agreement brokered by Mullah Omar. One of the factions is led by Baitullah Mehsud. The other two are pro-Afghan Taliban factions based in South and North Waziristan, which had largely refrained from attacking the Pakistan state and army but may not do so any longer. The army is also worried that the surge could cause a further flight of Afghan Taliban and other militants into the tribal areas. If the army acts against them, retaliatory strikes may follow across Pakistan. If it doesn’t, US and Afghan soldiers might chase them inside Pakistan – as they did last September, killing 20 tribesmen ‘by mistake’. Any such incursion would unite the Pashtun tribes behind the Taliban, deepen anti-American sentiment in the army and stretch US-Afghan-Pakistani co-operation to breaking point.

The removal of India and Kashmir from the strategic review makes clear Delhi’s growing influence in Washington. During his campaign Obama argued that Pakistan would be more likely to stay focused not on India but on the militants on the Pakistan-Afghan border if there was a concerted effort to resolve the Kashmir crisis. In a lobbying push of near Israeli proportions, however, Obama was told that Richard Holbrooke, his special envoy, would be shunned in Delhi if any link were made between Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and by January it was announced that Kashmir would not be part of Holbrooke’s portfolio.

The announcement was met with scorn in Islamabad, but many Pakistani analysts (and military officers) agree that Kashmir is better handled bilaterally. They also agree that the four-year-old Pakistan-India peace process suffered a near mortal blow with the discovery that Pakistanis were behind the attacks in Mumbai. This is particularly troubling because the process had achieved not only quiet but progress, including on Kashmir: an outline for a deal based on demilitarisation, open borders and a form of self-government or autonomy that would unite the divided territory. The Pakistani army attempted to defuse tensions along the Line of Control, closing militant training camps and co-ordinating security with the Indian army.

The process collapsed partly because of the political crisis that engulfed Musharraf after he sacked Pakistan’s chief justice in 2007. But it also fell apart because India did not reciprocate: military rule in Indian-occupied Kashmir remained as entrenched as ever. ‘The army’s recent experience with India is very bitter,’ a Pakistani analyst told me. ‘After 2004 the army scaled down militant intrusions into Kashmir by 95 per cent. And India’s response was to refuse to talk about Kashmir. The army thinks it would be the same in Afghanistan if it abandoned the Afghan Taliban.’ In the last year Indian Kashmir has seen increased penetration by Pakistani militants and skirmishes between the Pakistani and Indian armies. The spike seems to have less to do with Kashmir, where violence is at its lowest ebb in 20 years, than with the proxy war in Afghanistan. And it would suggest that – far more than on strategic reviews – peace in Afghanistan rests on peace between India and Pakistan. The road out of Kabul goes through Kashmir.

Published in the London Review of Books

WASIM VIEW- Usher’s article doesnt usher in anything new (pardon the pun) in concept or analysis but it does well in painting the big picture.  The good and bad Taliban as perceived by Pakistan are laid bare as are the evil designs of India in Afghanistan. US-Pakistan relations or the lack therof  are also laid bare and I could not say it better than Usher when he coins the US-Pakistan relationship since 9/11 as ‘ Washington using Islamabad as a gun for hire’.

The article sheds some light on the evil Indian agenda which will fail. As Usher writes in the article ‘Delhi sees the new Afghanistan as a part of its sphere of influence. It has four consulates in Afghanistan and has given its government $1.2 billion in aid: a remarkable sum for it to donate to a country that is 99 per cent Muslim and with which it has no common border. Delhi has also put up the new parliament building and chancery, and has helped to train the army. The proof is in the pudding is it not.

To conclude it seems to me at least that with American support, India feels confident of enforcing her agenda on a boxed-in Pakistan. But both the Indians and Americans are barking up the wrong tree since Pakistan is well aware of their evil agenda. Hence the doublespeak with the Afghan Taliban will persist as Pakistan sees US and Indian interest at their western border as fleeting and temporary and  not based on common interests but as an opportunity to spite the Pakistani state or to cut it to size.

If Uncle Sam and not-so-shining India were serious about stabilising Afghanistan then I believe Pakistan could work with both to bring about peace even at the cost of losing so-called traditional friends of Pakistan like the Afghan Taliban. However it is as clear as day that both America and India seek to fulfil their own narrow agendas in the region which are increasingly divergent from the state interests of Pakistan..

Even now, not all is lost and it is hoped that President Obama can achieve a rebirth into ‘Candidate Obama’, a man who promised to help resolve the Kashmir dispute and thus serve as a bridge for improving Pakistan-India relations.  Kashmir will secure Kabul in my opinion, a view echoed by Usher who ends the article saying that the road out of Kabul goes through Kashmir, I could not have said it any better.

And to end, I offer the Pakistani viewpoint on issues Taliban via Hussain Haqqani who is Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US. It is well worth a read.

How Pakistan is Countering the Taliban by Husain Haqqani

The specter of extremist Taliban taking over a nuclear-armed Pakistan is not only a gross exaggeration, it could also lead to misguided policy prescriptions from Pakistan’s allies, including our friends in Washington.

Pakistan and the international community do face serious challenges in confronting terrorists and the ideologies that sustain them. But panicked reactions of the type witnessed in the U.S. media over the last few weeks — after the Taliban drove into Buner, a town 60 miles north of the capital Islamabad — are not conducive to strengthening Pakistani democracy or to developing an effective counterterrorism policy for Pakistan.

Now that the Taliban have been driven out of Buner, and Pakistani forces have militarily engaged them just outside their Swat Valley stronghold, it should be clear to all that Pakistan can and will defeat the Taliban.

In the free elections that returned Pakistan to democracy in February 2008, Pakistanis overwhelmingly rejected Taliban sympathizers and advocates of extremist Islamist ideologies. But the legacy of dictatorship, including a tolerance for some militant groups, has proven tough to erase. Anti-American rhetoric and Pakistan’s traditional security concerns about its neighbors have also dampened popular enthusiasm for strong military action against violent extremists, even though President Asif Zardari has repeatedly declared the war against them a war for Pakistan’s soul.

Meanwhile, the change of administration in the U.S. has slowed the flow of assistance to Pakistan. Unfortunately, ordinary Pakistanis have begun to wonder if our alliance with the West is bringing any benefits at all.

Under the Musharraf dictatorship, Pakistan probably was not as quick as it needed to be to comprehend the enormity of the Taliban threat. And after last year’s election of democratic leaders, our new government had an array of domestic issues to address. Mobilizing all elements of national power, particularly public opinion, against the Taliban threat took time because many Pakistanis thought the Taliban were amenable to negotiations and would keep their word.

Recent developments offer us an opportunity amid crisis. More Pakistanis are now convinced of the need to confront the extremists.

The recent spike of international concern about the threat in Pakistan seems to stem from the recent dialogue between the government of the Pashtunkhwa Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan and a local movement that supported Islamic law but did not join the Taliban’s violent campaign. The goal for this dialogue was twofold — first, to restore order and stability to the Swat Valley; and second, to wedge rational elements of the religiously conservative population away from terrorists and fanatics.

The model here was the successful pacification of Fallujah in Iraq, where agreements with more moderate elements broke them away from al Qaeda nihilists. The model worked so well in Fallujah that it is now being resurrected by the American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The goal in Pakistan’s Swat Valley was the same.

The dialogue in Swat resulted in an agreement that would allow for elements of Shariah to be applied to the judicial system of the Valley, as it has at other times in our nation’s history. This agreement demanded that the native Taliban put down their weapons, pledge nonviolence, and accept the writ of the state. It was a local solution for what some in Pakistan viewed as a local problem.

Let me be perfectly clear here: Pakistan’s civil and military leadership understands that al Qaeda and its allies are not potential negotiating partners. But, as the U.S. did in Iraq, Pakistan sought to distinguish between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements within an expanding insurgency.

The premise of the dialogue was peace. Without peace there is no agreement, and without an agreement the Pakistani government will use all power at its disposal to restore order in the Valley. We’d rather negotiate than fight. But if we have to fight we will — and we will fight to win.

What does Pakistan need to contain this threat? In the short term we need the U.S. to share modern technology in antiterrorist engagement. Pakistan needs night-vision equipment, jammers that can knock out FM radio transmissions by the terrorists, and a larger, modernized fleet of helicopter gunships for ground support in the massive sweeps that are necessary to contain, repel and destroy the enemy.

Yet Washington has been reluctant to share this modern equipment, and to train our military in antiterrorism techniques, because of concerns that these systems could be used against India. Such concerns are misplaced. Pakistanis understand that the primary threat to our homeland today is not from our neighbor to the east but from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on our border with Afghanistan. To meet this threat, we must be provided the means to fight the terrorists while we work on resuming our composite dialogue with India.

In the long term, Pakistan’s security will be predicated on Pakistan’s economic viability. That is the central thrust of the Kerry-Lugar legislation currently before Congress, which would establish a 10-year, multibillion dollar commitment to Pakistan’s economic and social system. It is also manifest in the Regional Opportunity Zone legislation currently before Congress that would open U.S. markets to products manufactured in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s FATA region. An economically prosperous Pakistan will be less susceptible to the ideology of international terrorism — and it will become a model to a billion Muslims across the world that Islam and modernity under democracy are not only compatible, but can thrive together.

Published in the Wall Street Journal

WASIM VIEW- Husain Haqqani has been lauded publicly by Hillary Clinton recently and is regularly derided as the US Ambassador to Pakistan! Yet his article makes sense in the main although it is written for an international audience namely the US paymaster general.

Haqqani does well to allay fears of a Taliban takeover that is nigh impossible and the nightmare that keeps Uncle Sam awake during night and day. The US is put on the dock for their lack of military equipment support including FM radio jamming equipment to stop Mullah Radio of Swat airing his diatribe.I echo such sentiments but I do not agree with Haqqani that the Kerry-Lugar bill and other support will prove the panacea for Pakistan’s ills.

I believe that the US is not serious in establishing a strategic partnership with Pakistan, except for do more and more and they say this ad nausem. Pakistan is being used as a cheap proxy to do America’s bidding in the region and it must stop and it is high time the Gillani government moves in this direction as part of a made in Pakistan foreign policy that protects Pakistani state interests and nothing else.

As the X Files told the world ‘the truth is out there’, well Hillary has caught on and told the ‘Taliban Truth’ at a US  Committee hearing.  The truth that Uncle Sam created the monster that is the Taliban aka the then ‘mujahideen’ and that as usual having used and abused them and Pakistan Uncle Sam left. Enjoy the Taliban Truth below:

On the eve of President Zardari’s first meeting with President Obama, I am posting Obama’s newest diatribe on issues concerning Pakistan. The subtitle of the post in indicative as I have called Obama’s comments as Hussein’s  hissy fit by the artist still known in some circles as Hussein Obama.

Indeed the Pakistani media and the Muslim media at large delighted at the  Muslim heritage President Obama could natuarally claim and waxed eloquent that his presidency would be the panacea for the world’s  ills. The Pakistani media in particular went on an overdrive never tiring of using the till now middle name of Hussein whenever mentioning Barack Obama.

Today the Pakistani media is mute now after realising in only one hundred days that Hussein Obama is more vocal and not less vocal against Pakistan. Indeed the condescending tone with which Obama belittles Pakistani democracy after his beloved country  supported dictatorship and looked the other way when the democratic forces fought martial law is criminal.

Worse the fact that President Obama is the first US President to so publicly attack Pakistani efforts and its democratic government irrespective of its poor performance smacks of a total disregard for Pakistan and shows an inherent imperial outlook in a man who promised change. And change it is!

Even during the infamous Bush era, Pakistan was not disgraced in such a way and never ever by the office and the person of the President. And before it all boils over,  here is Hussein’s hissy fit (view from 0.43 to 3.45)

April’s B-side contents are:

•    A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan by BARACK OBAMA
•    With Obama At the World’s Most Dangerous Place by Prof AKBAR AHMED
•    Munich Conference Speech by SHAH MEHMOOD QURESHI

I begin the debate with the celebrity President and from the horse’s mouth as it were with President Obama speech on America’s new policy and include too its transcript. It is a must watch and read, do especially read my views on the policy.

A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan by BARACK OBAMA

We begin the speech that is shown in two parts:

The second part of Barack Obama’s speech:

The full text of the Obama speech is shown below:

Good morning. Today, I am announcing a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This marks the conclusion of a careful policy review that I ordered as soon as I took office. My Administration has heard from our military commanders and diplomats. We have consulted with the Afghan and Pakistani governments; with our partners and NATO allies; and with other donors and international organizations. And we have also worked closely with members of Congress here at home. Now, I’d like to speak clearly and candidly to the American people.

The situation is increasingly perilous. It has been more than seven years since the Taliban was removed from power, yet war rages on, and insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Attacks against our troops, our NATO allies, and the Afghan government have risen steadily. Most painfully, 2008 was the deadliest year of the war for American forces.

Many people in the United States and many in partner countries that have sacrificed so much have a simple question: What is our purpose in Afghanistan? After so many years, they ask, why do our men and women still fight and die there? They deserve a straightforward answer.

So let me be clear: al Qaeda and its allies the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks are in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan. And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged ñ that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.

The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan. In the nearly eight years since 9/11, al Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier. This almost certainly includes al Qaeda’s leadership: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They have used this mountainous terrain as a safe-haven to hide, train terrorists, communicate with followers, plot attacks, and send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. For the American people, this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world.

But this is not simply an American problem far from it. It is, instead, an international security challenge of the highest order. Terrorist attacks in London and Bali were tied to al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it too is likely to have ties to al Qaedaís leadership in Pakistan. The safety of people around the world is at stake.

For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people especially women and girls. The return in force of al Qaeda terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.

As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people. We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its future. We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists.

So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That is the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the same: we will defeat you.

To achieve our goals, we need a stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy. To focus on the greatest threat to our people, America must no longer deny resources to Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq. To enhance the military, governance, and economic capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we have to marshal international support. And to defeat an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war, we must recognize the fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan which is why I’ve appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to serve as Special Representative for both countries, and to work closely with General David Petraeus to integrate our civilian and military efforts.

Let me start by addressing the way forward in Pakistan.

The United States has great respect for the Pakistani people. They have a rich history, and have struggled against long odds to sustain their democracy. The people of Pakistan want the same things that we want: an end to terror, access to basic services, the opportunity to live their dreams, and the security that can only come with the rule of law. The single greatest threat to that future comes from al Qaeda and their extremist allies, and that is why we must stand together.

The terrorists within Pakistanís borders are not simply enemies of America or Afghanistan ñ they are a grave and urgent danger to the people of Pakistan. Al Qaeda and other violent extremists have killed several thousand Pakistanis since 9/11. They have killed many Pakistani soldiers and police. They assassinated Benazir Bhutto. They have blown up buildings, derailed foreign investment, and threatened the stability of the state. Make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within.

It is important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs our help in going after al Qaeda. This is no simple task. The tribal regions are vast, rugged, and often ungoverned. That is why we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists. And after years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken one way or another when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets.

The governmentís ability to destroy these safe-havens is tied to its own strength and security. To help Pakistan weather the economic crisis, we must continue to work with the IMF, the World Bank and other international partners. To lessen tensions between two nuclear-armed nations that too often teeter on the edge of escalation and confrontation, we must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan. To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistanís democratic institutions and the Pakistani people. And to demonstrate through deeds as well as words a commitment that is enduring, we must stand for lasting opportunity.

A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. Al Qaeda offers the people of Pakistan nothing but destruction. We stand for something different. So today, I am calling upon Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by John Kerry and Richard Lugar that authorizes $1.5 billion in direct support to the Pakistani people every year over the next five years resources that will build schools, roads, and hospitals, and strengthen Pakistanís democracy. I’m also calling on Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by Maria Cantwell, Chris Van Hollen and Peter Hoekstra that creates opportunity zones in the border region to develop the economy and bring hope to places plagued by violence. And we will ask our friends and allies to do their part ñ including at the donors conference in Tokyo next month.

I do not ask for this support lightly. These are challenging times, and resources are stretched. But the American people must understand that this is a down payment on our own future ñ because the security of our two countries is shared. Pakistanís government must be a stronger partner in destroying these safe-havens, and we must isolate al Qaeda from the Pakistani people.

These steps in Pakistan are also indispensable to our effort in Afghanistan, which will see no end to violence if insurgents move freely back and forth across the border.

Security demands a new sense of shared responsibility. That is why we will launch a standing, trilateral dialogue among the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our nations will meet regularly, with Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates leading our effort. Together, we must enhance intelligence sharing and military cooperation along the border, while addressing issues of common concern like trade, energy, and economic development.

This is just one part of a comprehensive strategy to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the al Qaeda safe-haven that it was before 9/11. To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban’s gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government.

Our troops have fought bravely against a ruthless enemy. Our civilians have made great sacrifices. Our allies have borne a heavy burden. Afghans have suffered and sacrificed for their future. But for six years, Afghanistan has been denied the resources that it demands because of the war in Iraq. Now, we must make a commitment that can accomplish our goals.

I have already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops that had been requested by General McKiernan for many months. These soldiers and Marines will take the fight to the Taliban in the south and east, and give us a greater capacity to partner with Afghan Security Forces and to go after insurgents along the border. This push will also help provide security in advance of the important presidential election in August.

At the same time, we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan Security Forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country. That is how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our troops home.

For three years, our commanders have been clear about the resources they need for training. Those resources have been denied because of the war in Iraq. Now, that will change. The additional troops that we deployed have already increased our training capacity. Later this spring we will deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan Security Forces. For the first time, this will fully resource our effort to train and support the Afghan Army and Police. Every American unit in Afghanistan will be partnered with an Afghan unit, and we will seek additional trainers from our NATO allies to ensure that every Afghan unit has a coalition partner. We will accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan Army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011 and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward.

This push must be joined by a dramatic increase in our civilian effort. Afghanistan has an elected government, but it is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency. The people of Afghanistan seek the promise of a better future. Yet once again, have seen the hope of a new day darkened by violence and uncertainty.

To advance security, opportunity, and justice not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces we need agricultural specialists and educators; engineers and lawyers. That is how we can help the Afghan government serve its people, and develop an economy that isnít dominated by illicit drugs. That is why I am ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground. And that is why we must seek civilian support from our partners and allies, from the United Nations and international aid organizations an effort that Secretary Clinton will carry forward next week in the Hague.

At a time of economic crisis, it is tempting to believe that we can short-change this civilian effort. But make no mistake: our efforts will fail in Afghanistan and Pakistan if we don’t invest in their future. That is why my budget includes indispensable investments in our State Department and foreign assistance programs. These investments relieve the burden on our troops. They contribute directly to security. They make the American people safer. And they save us an enormous amount of money in the long run because it is far cheaper to train a policeman to secure their village or to help a farmer seed a crop, than it is to send our troops to fight tour after tour of duty with no transition to Afghan responsibility.

As we provide these resources, the days of unaccountable spending, no-bid contracts, and wasteful reconstruction must end. So my budget will increase funding for a strong Inspector General at both the State Department and USAID, and include robust funding for the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction.

And I want to be clear: we cannot turn a blind eye to the corruption that causes Afghans to lose faith in their own leaders. Instead, we will seek a new compact with the Afghan government that cracks down on corrupt behavior, and sets clear benchmarks for international assistance so that it is used to provide for the needs of the Afghan people.

In a country with extreme poverty that has been at war for decades, there will also be no peace without reconciliation among former enemies. I have no illusions that this will be easy. In Iraq, we had success in reaching out to former adversaries to isolate and target al Qaeda. We must pursue a similar process in Afghanistan, while understanding that it is a very different country.

There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated. But there are also those who have taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course. That is why we will work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province. As their ranks dwindle, an enemy that has nothing to offer the Afghan people but terror and repression must be further isolated. And we will continue to support the basic human rights of all Afghans ñ including women and girls.

Going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable. We’ll consistently assess our efforts to train Afghan Security Forces, and our progress in combating insurgents. We will measure the growth of Afghanistanís economy, and its illicit narcotics production. And we will review whether we are using the right tools and tactics to make progress towards accomplishing our goals.

None of the steps that I have outlined will be easy, and none should be taken by America alone. The world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos or al Qaeda operates unchecked. We have a shared responsibility to act ñ not because we seek to project power for its own sake, but because our own peace and security depends upon it. And what’s at stake now is not just our own security it is the very idea that free nations can come together on behalf of our common security. That was the founding cause of NATO six decades ago. That must be our common purpose today.

My Administration is committed to strengthening international organizations and collective action, and that will be my message next week in Europe. As America does more, we will ask others to join us in doing their part. From our partners and NATO allies, we seek not simply troops, but rather clearly defined capabilities: supporting the Afghan elections, training Afghan Security Forces, and a greater civilian commitment to the Afghan people. For the United Nations, we seek greater progress for its mandate to coordinate international action and assistance, and to strengthen Afghan institutions.

And finally, together with the United Nations, we will forge a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who should have a stake in the security of the region our NATO allies and other partners, but also the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia, India and China. None of these nations benefit from a base for al Qaeda terrorists, and a region that descends into chaos. All have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and security and development.

That is true, above all, for the coalition that has fought together in Afghanistan, side by side with Afghans. The sacrifices have been enormous. Nearly 700 Americans have lost their lives. Troops from over twenty other countries have also paid the ultimate price. All Americans honor the service and cherish the friendship of those who have fought, and worked, and bled by our side. And all Americans are awed by the service of our own men and women in uniform, who have borne a burden as great as any other generations. They and their families embody the example of selfless sacrifice.

The United States of America did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan. Nearly 3,000 of our people were killed on September 11, 2001, for doing nothing more than going about their daily lives. Al Qaeda and its allies have since killed thousands of people in many countries. Most of the blood on their hands is the blood of Muslims, who al Qaeda has killed and maimed in far greater numbers than any other people. That is the future that al Qaeda is offering to the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan a future without opportunity or hope; a future without justice or peace.

The road ahead will be long. There will be difficult days. But we will seek lasting partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan that serve the promise of a new day for their people. And we will use all elements of our national power to defeat al Qaeda, and to defend America, our allies, and all who seek a better future. Because the United States of America stands for peace and security, justice and opportunity. That is who we are, and that is what history calls on us to do once more.

Thank you, God Bless You, and God Bless the United States of America.

Published in The News

WASIM VIEW- Before I analyse the new policy I must comment on a related aspect which is that I find the Obama Administration to be pernicious in referring to Afghanistan and Pakistan as AfPak. Such a cavalier regard to my country I find to be spiteful and proves that even after Bush, the fools rule.  It is within this context that the new policy needs to be viewed with an arrogant America belittling a nuclear Pakistan putting it on par with our failed state of a neighbour.

In terms of the policy, I find it to be more of the same with only cosmetic changes trumpeted as much more than that by the slick PR machine that is Obama. It is ‘do more’ again and is old wine in a new bottle and I can summarise it best as dollars for drones.

The military and civilian aid promised has pleased the Pakistani government but not the masses who see it as short change for services rendered with Pakistan as proxy for Uncle Sam’s tussle with Al-Qaeda. Indeed Pakistan’s Finance Ministry has stated that the war on terror has cost Pakistan financially alone a loss of $35bn so who is President Obama kidding with his much trumpeted aid to the people of Pakistan of £1.5bn a year, these are pennies or paisa and he can keep it I say.

I have chosen not to indulge in a nitpick exercise on the speech but I do wonder which planet President Obama and his fanclub are on. Is it not an admission of US failure  when President Obama says ‘ it has been more than seven years since the Taliban were removed from power, yet war rages on, and insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Remember this has all happened on NATO’s watch supported of course by the sole superpower of Uncle Sam! 

President Obama’s monumental mistake in his new strategy is in continuing a transactional US-Pakistan relationship. Indeed when Barack ‘No Blank Check’ Obama warned Pakistan of Uncle Sam’s no blank check policy, it reaffirmed to Pakistan that the US under change-we-cant Obama continues to engage only on its terms wielding dollars to the political elite to co-opt its support as and when needed. Indeed the blank check jibe is indicative of the flawed strategy and smacks of a lack of trust and commitment to a nation that has given its all.

Choice words of praise ‘our allies have borne a heavy burden’ are not enough. Candidate Obama campaigned on the platform of ‘Change We Can Believe In’, however President Obama’s changed US policy is not change but more of the same. It is not change and Pakistan does not believe in it too.

The second article is analysis of the Obama speech by my mentor and hero Professor Akbar Ahmed. Its well worth a read:

With Obama At the World’s Most Dangerous Place by Akbar Ahmed

Seated a few yards in front of President Obama as his invited guest at the White House on Friday, March 27, I heard him describe the areas I had been in charge of including Waziristan as “the most dangerous place in the world.”

Obama was laying out what I suspect will become the signature foreign policy effort of his presidency. He had shifted the American focus of the last eight years from the Middle East to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ultimately he will be judged by the success or failure of the objectives he laid out in his speech.

As if to confirm the sentiment of Obama’s speech, at the same time as he delivered it, a suicide bomber in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan blew himself up and seventy other people in a mosque at Friday prayer. Around the same time, an Afghan soldier, trained by Americans, turned his gun on two American soldiers killing them and then shot himself. The stakes, therefore, could not be higher.

Obama laid out a persuasive argument, something that I had been doing for several years that in order to stabilize Afghanistan, its neighbor Pakistan had to be stabilized. Obama’s political insight was that Pakistan could not be stabilized without first calming and controlling the border areas that lie between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Obama rightly made a distinction between al-Qaeda who would be challenged and defeated and the general Taliban who were to be treated differently. There were those Taliban who could be talked to and eventually brought in, and those who were not redeemable.

Afghanistan will receive the attention it deserves but could not get because of the war in Iraq, and Pakistan will no longer be neglected. For Pakistan Obama committed $1.5 billion in aid annually for the next five years. While applauding Obama’s generosity, I would urge him to ensure that the rulers of Afghanistan and Pakistan account for the $16-17 billion in American aid already given since 9/11 before providing more funds for their Swiss bank accounts.

As a Pakistani, it was a pleasure to hear an American president speak with such respect of the people of Pakistan. Obama talked of the suffering of the Pakistanis at the hand of the terrorists after 9/11. He even mentioned the large numbers of Pakistani soldiers killed in action along Pakistan’s international border while attempting to bring law and order.

I was equally impressed as I am sure most Pakistanis were–that he was the first American president I have heard pronounce the name of the country correctly. It is difficult for the people of that country to take American commentators too seriously when they pronounce Iran as “I-ran”, Iraq as “I-rack”, or Qatar as “gutter.”

But, eloquence and diction will not get Obama very far in the rugged terrain that he has rightly called lethally dangerous for America and the world. If he fails to control the tribal areas, Obama will find his policy unraveling and the fears of American commentators that this may very well become “Obama’s Vietnam” may prove correct.

So as someone who was directly in charge of three divisions in Baluchistan and several of the Tribal Areas in the Frontier Province, let me offer my suggestions based on my experiences.

My first suggestion is that Obama stop the drone strikes. At the moment, the issue of the drone strikes in the Tribal Areas is a highly sensitive and inflammatory one. While some “bad guys” may be killed in the strikes, there is little doubt that too many “good guys” are lost in the process–and many of them are women and children. This causes widespread outrage and fuels the anti-Americanism which is already rampant.

There is talk of opening up a new chapter by ordering drone strikes in Baluchistan. Not a good idea. The colonial British assiduously prevented the Baluch tribe of Baluchistan and Pashtun tribes of Southern Afghanistan and Pakistani agencies like North and South Waziristan from ever teaming up against them. I can predict that with the first drone strike in Baluchistan, America will ensure that this occurs. As a result, the Taliban will gain new supporters and vast strategic depth.

And for those who may still have a cocky arrogance about dealing with these “tribal people,” I would suggest they take a look at the map and confront the reality that the Baluch share hundreds of miles of border with Iran which will undoubtedly provide covert aid to put further pressure on its American adversaries.

Secondly, Obama must encourage the Pakistani government to stabilize law and order at the district level, the basic unit of administration. This can be done by revamping the civilian administrative structure in the tribal areas and districts of Pakistan. The vast majority of Pakistanis are fed up with the anarchy in their country and want to focus their lives on food, employment, and education for their families. Above all, they want law and order, which the district administration once provided. The district structure has been marginalized to the point of irrelevance over the last decade, and in its vacuum feudal lords, corrupt policemen and army soldiers play havoc with ordinary Pakistanis. An independent, honest, and competent civil administration, backed by an independent judiciary, would provide immediate relief and justice at the district level.

In the Tribal Areas, the office of the political agent, along with the structure of tribal administration should be revived and strengthened, and the army used in aid of civil power and not to thwart it. It has been clearly shown that the army cannot deal effectively with the tribes.

Thirdly, in the tribal areas the council of elders, the jirgas that act as a tribal body providing justice and stability and the religious scholars advocating calm and stability should be strengthened. Some of these have become particular targets of the Taliban. But they are an effective inbuilt structural check to the Taliban.

Fourthly, the madrassas which form a vast, complex network of potential recruiting arenas for the Taliban need to be vigorously reformed. With the kind of money Pakistanis are receiving they should also be told that a large percentage should go to this reformation providing new syllabi, teachers training programs, and up to date equipment. This action will go a long way toward securing the next generation of Pakistanis.

Finally, follow up on the sensitivity shown by Obama in his approach to the Pakistani people and emphasize friendship and honor. I would suggest less bluster and more diplomacy on the part of those who are being sent out as part of Obama’s efforts in the field.

Back at the White House, as I sat sensing the charisma of Obama and the eloquence of his words, I could not help but feel that I was seated in the front row watching history unfold.

I wondered whether he or those whose task it was to implement the President’s vision were fully aware of the enormity of the challenge, as indeed I was.

Published in the Huffington Post

WASIM VIEW-Professor Akbar Ahmed is a personal hero of mine and a master of his trade. Prof Ahmed is spot on when he notes that the Obama Afghanistan and Pakistan policy will be the signature foreign policy effort of his presidency.

Prof Ahmed’s article is a cogent one with praise and criticism of the Obama policy. Prof Ahmed is right when he praises President  Obama for speaking directly to the Pakistani people. However I politely differ with him in deeming this as respect as I believe his actions sorry drones speak louder than his words and show his real respect for the Pakistani people. However I do echo Prof Ahmed’s praise of President Obama in being the first US President in prounouncing Pakistan correctly.

Prof Akbar Ahmed’s demolition of the US position on drones is just that, a demolition. In particular he speaks with clarity and authority as he has personally been in charge of Balochistan and the Tribal Areas and can call on his experience to support his arguments. I second Prof Ahmed’s support for the revival of the office of the political agent and the tribal administration.

Other suggestions such as madrassa reform and strengthening the jirga or council of elders make eminent sense too. All in all Prof Akbar Ahmed’s strategy by the way of his article is spot on and free advice, the Obama Administration would do well to heed it.

The third article is in fact a speech by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi delivered at the Munich Security Conference. It is  worth a read as it was made before the Obama strategy was announced and thus represents the Pakistani position on the issue. Please hear the speech too on the website link shown at the end of the article.

Munich Conference Speech by Shah Mehmood Qureshi

Your Excellency, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of 45. Munich Security Conference, Excellencies, Distinguished participants, Ladies and Gentleman,

It is a matter of great privilege and honour for me to address the 45th Munich Security Conference, a premier forum for candid deliberations on global security issues.

I am grateful for this opportunity to share Pakistan’s views on NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and its future. This issue is of vital importance for peace and stability in our region. I wish to thank Abassador Wolfgang Ischinger for this timely and important initiative.

To us in Pakistan, Afghanistan holds a special significance. Peace and security of our two countries are interlinked. What afflicts one, invariably impacts the other. For the last three decades, Pakistan has suffered the gravest fallout of the conflict in Afghanistan- Our stakes in its peace and stability are therefore, high.

Regrettably, our region, has for far too long, been a victim of history and circumstance. Over time, the troubles of Afghanistan have gone through different phases, morphing into one of the gravest and most serious challenges of our times: the challenge of extremism, militancy and terrorism.

But let’s be very clear. The genesis of the problem goes back to the decade-long foreign occupation of Afghanistan and the deliberate expoitation of religion by the free world to defeat a super power. The legacy of this strategy is now threatening the whole world. We are all equally responsible for it.

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, in 1989, should have been followed by a well thought-out and comprehensive plan, to rebuild the country, within a democratic, pluralistic framework. The international community should have assisted Afghanistan, in reconstructing its devastated physical, social and institutional infrastructure.

The international community should have provided opportunities for education and livelihood to the youth and the freedom fighters. A country-wide disarmament process should have been initiated. Instead, the hapless Afghans were all but abandoned. Flushed with weapons, fired with ideology, and forgotten as the last vestige of a war just won, Afghanistan was left in a crippling security and socio-political vacuum.

International neglect, widespread poverty, lack of governance and sustained internecine warfare provided further grounds to the insidious spread of extremism and extremist ideologies.

The rise of the Taliban has to be seen in this context. Subsequently, the Taliban were hijacked by Al Quaeda thus creating a dangerous nexus. What followed is history.

Pakistan, as a frontline State during the Afghan Jihad could not and did not remain immune to these trends and tragedies unfolding across its western border. The presence in our country of the largest human refugee population in contemporary times stands testimony to this reality.

While this dangerous affliction was spreading, silently gnawing at the fabric of our societies, the world looked the other way. Sadly, it took more than 3.000 lives, and a barbaric atrocity of the scale of 9/11 to awaken the world to the gravity of the situation.

The world`s response was prompt and massive. Since then the international community, including NATO has maintained a firm commitment to peace, stability and development of Afghanistan. Pakistan has been an integral and leading partner of this global endeavour.

Yet, seven years on, despite having made significant gains, the malady of extremism and terrorism continues to plague the region. It has roots in all countries of the region. The challenge confronting us today is big and complex.

A confluence of latent and conflicting interests, invisible hands, covert policies, free flow of arms, money and drugs and misplaced priorities have added to the complexity of the situation.

Popular perceptions of longstanding and festering disputes involving the Muslim populations, for example, in the Middle East, Iraq, Kashmir and more recently in Gaza, are further compounding factors.

It is time for dispassionate stock-taking. We need to honestly ask ourselves some basic questions:

One: Seven years on whether militancy and terrorism has been reigned in or is in fact spreading. What is the popular perception about the military strategy of the coalition in Afghanistan?

Two: What are the underlying causes and rallying points formenting extremism and terrorism? Are these beeing addressed in a meaningful and comprehensive manner?

Three: Has international assistance brought about a significant improvement in the lifes of the affected people? Is the international community truly following a broad-based and comprehensive approach to deal with this scourge?

After Afghanistan, perhaps no country has suffered more in human and material terms than Pakistan. We lost Benazir Bhuttoto to terrorists. Nearly 2,000 Pakistanis lost their lifes in more than 600 terror related incidents last year alone. Pakistan’s economy has suffered direct and indirect losses of more than $ 35 billion.

In October last year, the Parliament of Pakistan adopted a historic Resolution declaring the Pakistani nation’s unswerving commitment to stand against the threat of terrorism and to address its root causes. This Resolution provides a comprehensive framework for a multi-proged strategy to deal with this serious menace. It also sent a clear message that the territory of Pakistan will not be used for terrorist activities, while our sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.

In line withe this resolution, we are pursuing a multiproged strategy with the support, cooperation and owership of local populations. Recent distractions at our eastern frontier notwithstanding, Pakistan is assiduously fulfilling its responsibilities along the western border.

The dawn of democracy in Pakistan has heralded a new era of understanding and cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. With Afghanistan, our democratic government has made a new and promising beginning. This has resulted in restoring trust and confidence and bringing about a fundamental and qualitative transformation in bilateral ties with Afghanistan in all spheres.

We have joined hands to move towards our common vision of peace, prosperity and development for our people and the region. During President Asif Ali Zardari’s historic visit to Kabul last month, I had the pleasure of signing, together with Foreign Minister Spanta, a landmark Declaration on Future Directions of Bilateral Cooperation.

The Declaration looks beyond the present phase of terrorism, and provides a clear and comprehensive framework to take forward Pakistan-Afghanistan partnership to higher levels, in the political, economic, security and social fields. It is also a manifestation of the aspirations and determination of our people for a better, peaceful and prosperous tomorrow.

Creating an implementing projects such as the Turkmenistan -Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline project would create a stake for people living all along the route. A stake, where peace would pay clear dividends.

The Jirgagai process, emanating from Kabul Peace Jirga, has been a great success in bringing the representative segments of the people of the two countries together. The Jirgagai meeting held in Islamabad in October last year, made important strides in achieving dual objective of promoting dialogue with the opposition and forging a common agenda for development and people-to-people exchanges. Since then two further meetings of Contact Group of Jirgagai have taken place, achieving positive results.

Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are resolved to pursuing the Jirgagai process as a useful means for promoting dialogue and development.

The Tripartite Military Commission mechanism has proven useful in enhancing coordination both at the strategic and tactical levels. However, we remain concerned about financing and arming of militants. Recent incursions in our territory by militants are a matter of serious concern. Pakistan wishes to see the tripartite mechanism further strengthened.

More than 3 million Afghan refugees who are still in Pakistan pose an additional security risk, often providing nurseries and sanctuaries to militants.

On the regional plane, Pakistan will be hosting the 3rd Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) on 1-2 April 2009. We are in close touch with Afghan authorities and our international partners to make this conference focused and result-oriented. This event, we hope, will prove to be a milestone in assisting Afghanistan in its developmental efforts and forging greater regional cooperation.

Critical situations demand critical appraisals. This is an opportune moment to readjust our strategy on the basis of lessons learnt. Our way forward must be grounded in strict adherence to principles enshrined in the UN Charter, observance of international law and respect for the free will and aspirations of sovereign States and their peoples.

It is our considered view that the future course of action to deal with this growing problem should incorporate the following essential elements:

One: The international community must adopt a regional approach in resolving this problem which is essentially regional in nature. Only those solutions enjoying the support of regional countries would be sustainable.

Two: This complex problem requires a multi-faceted, comprehensive and balanced approach. Over emphasis on military dimension has not proved fruitul. For lasting success of any endeavour, the people must assume ownership.

Three: In the battle for hearts and minds, the power of persuasion must be stronger than the effects of coercion. An inclusive process must include dialogue and reconciliation.

Four: A generous focus on reconstruction, development and social welfare with participation of all stakeholders. To attain durable security, the dynamic and logic of development must trump the dynamic and logic of force. The campaign against extremism will not be won in the battlefield but in classrooms and the mind of the people.

Five: Drug money is a major source of terror-funding. There is a need to address this issue in a comprehensive manner. Farmers growing opium will have to be provided alternate opportunities.

Six: There is need for better coordination of international efforts. All disconnects and fragmentations, including within the international coalition and NATO must be addressed.

Seven: An extensive sensitization campaign should be launched with the support of local communities to neutralize the impact and influence of militant ideologies and to correct negative perceptions that fuel extremism.

Eight: Any lasting and sustainable solution must respect local customs, traditions, values and religious beliefs.

We know that the difficulties are complex and daunting, and the road ahead winding, bumpy and long. Yet these obstacles are not insurmountable. Pakistan welcomes the international community’s unwavering resolve to remain meaningfully and effectively engaged to help root out the menace of extremism and terrorism.

Pakistan is a principal partner in this global compaign. Pakistan is determined to tide the difficulties with the support of its friends and allies. We will continue to strengthen our partnership with the international community. It is well within our capacity to harness our resources to defeat the common enemy. Together we can achieve lasting peace and stability and craft a better tomorrow for our coming generations. I thank you.

Published with speech in audio on the Munich Security Conference Website

WASIM VIEW- Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s speech surprised me for its strong projection of the Pakistani position. Moreover Pakistan’s Foreign Minister delivered the speech in front of an invited audience of so-called foreign policy experts such as Henry Kissinger and it was a good one indeed.

The Foreign Minister was only too right when he reminded his Western audience that the Afghanistan problem is decades old saying that ‘the genesis of the problem goes back to the decade-long foreign occupation of Afghanistan and the deliberate expoitation of religion by the free world to defeat a super power. The legacy of this strategy is now threatening the whole world. We are all equally responsible for it’.

Afghanistan was left to rot and abandoned by the West  after it tired of its  red fetish a la Communism. Worse still, Pakistan has paid for and continues to pay the price of that ill on  behalf of  an unappreciative West. Indeed as the West sleeps easy even now,  it is Pakistan that lives a daily nightmare.

Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s is right too when he  reminds his audience of the Pakistani effort that ‘as a frontline state during the Afghan Jihad Pakistan could not and did not remain immune to these trends and tragedies unfolding across its western border. The presence in our country of the largest human refugee population in contemporary times stands testimony to this reality’. Later in the article the Foreign Minister rightly puts the West in the dock with his ‘Qureshi Questions’ proving how the West has failed in Afghanistan and the evidence is damning I feel.

Pakistan has lost its brave citizens and soldiers, its soil and even sanity. In purely numerical terms Pakistan has incurred lost over 2000 citizens, incurred a loss of more than $35bn and houses 3mn Afghan refugees at Pakistan’s pleasure while the West rabbits on and on and on with ‘do more’.

President Obama would do well to listen and learn from the Pakistani position as championed by the Foreign Minister. The Obama Administration should embed Pakistan’s eight elements as contained in the speech not in words but in actions and this is not the case thus far with the US listening but not learning. Drone attacks must end, otherwise the situation will get worse. I said a while back that Afghanistan could prove to be Obama’s Vietnam, a Vietnam indeed for another President and in another American century.

Pakistan is a country fighting a battle for its very survival thanks to the frantic efforts of its ever-hostile Eastern neighbour, the ineptitude of Uncle Sam on the Western border and its constant drone attacks on Pakistani areas, and General Zia’s legacy – a generation of fanatical Mullahs hell bent on destroying everything that the founders of Pakistan lived and died for.

Hardly a day passes when some depressing sorry about Pakistan does not dominate the national and increasingly the international headlines. From the Taliban imposing their tyranny on the peace loving people of Swat Valley, to the daily bombings and acts of wanton violence that blight Pakistan’s name throughout the world; to the trouble in Balochistan. Pakistan seems increasingly like a lost cause, a failed state on the brink of imploding.

Yet we must not lose heart. We must at this dark hour seek solace in the words of the Quaid: ‘Musalman musebat main ghabraya nahin karta!’ “A Muslim does not panic when adversity strikes”. The words of the Quaid’s beloved master (saw) as found in the Holy Quran are even more inspiring for the sorry state we find ourselves in “Fear not, Allah is with us”.

Yet we must not delude ourselves that a horde of angels will descend from a golden cloud and fight our battles for us. The Lord helps those who help themselves. We must overcome this nightmare ourselves with full faith that Allah will reward our efforts and Pakistan will emerge stronger than ever inshallah.

I have thought long and hard about how we can deal with the multiple challenges we currently face. Here follow my suggestions for dealing with these complex problems, I welcome feedback from readers so we can further develop these ideas and send some sort of draft policy plan to the movers and shakers in Islamabad in the (perhaps, slightly naive) hope that some of these ideas might be heeded to:

1. Break ranks with the USA. Announce that Pakistan will not tolerate any further drone attacks or breaches of its sovereignty. Pakistan will in the first instance expel the US ambassador, then take the issue to the United Nations and finally strike down any planes or drones that fly into our territory. If this leads to an aggressive stance from the US, withdrawal of aide, sanctions and possible military strikes then so be it. Pakistan will eventually be the target of the American war machine, no matter how obedient we are. So better to keep our self-respect and fight to save Pakistan than to lose our dignity as well as our country and nuclear assets.
2. Pakistan should ask NATO to seek a speedy exit from Afghanistan and ask the various factions within that country to come to the table to work out a joint strategy to govern that country. This will obviously include the Afghani Taliban. If NATO bows before the US, we should consider blocking Pakistan’s supply routes to NATO troops in Afghanistan.
3. The Government, opposition and all other stakeholders should come together and with the ‘US attacks’ excuse stripped from the terrorists a Pakistani anti – terrorist strategy should be worked out based on dealing with Jirgas, isolating the terrorist leaders and reconciling the elements who came to arms as a result of the policies of Musharraf. The deals signed should be unequivocal and should brook no compromise with those who want to establish their own mini-states or implement their own brand of Sharia. The deals should be purely based on a renunciation of violence, the arrest and trial of the main leaders of the terrorist groups and plans to develop and reconstruct the affected areas. If use of force is required against small groups of hardcore terrorists than Pakistan should not shrink from the task and seek to enrol the support of tribal or local lashkars in these attempts. Any military actions should be a last resort and carried out with due concern for minimising harm to civilian infrastructure and ordinary people.
4. Convince misguided Jihadis that fighting a war against the state of Pakistan is creating fasaad in the earth – not Jihad- and those guilty of taking up arms against the government that exists according to the principle of shura (mutual consultation as demonstrated during elections) is a worse crime than any other, being a rebellion against the Sharia itself. They should be nudged to include this in capital letters in the syllabuses of Madrassahs. It should made clear to the would be islamists that Islam cannot be implemented by coercion, and they should carry out tabligh to convince the majority to support sharia rule. This is the only legitimate way to create the kind of state that they would like to see. Madrassahs associated with people like Javed Ghamidi and others willing to give this message should be set up across Pakistan and especially in the areas where extremism is strong.
5. The government should stem the tide of rising extremism and talibanisation by promising to bring the laws of Pakistan into conformity with the Sharia. The way to do this already exists in the constitution. The recommendations of the Islamic ideology council should be brought to Parliament and discussed and debated, and brought into force as soon as they are agreed. The media should be made to obey a code of conduct that restricts shamelessness and immoral behaviour on television, radio and the print media. Law-enforcing agencies should announce a Jihad against prostitution, drugs, alchohol and gambling carrying out raids and punishing perpetrators across the country. No new laws or Taliban style moral police should be created for this Jihad. The present law of the Islamic republic should be implemented in full. As for the other ‘Islamic’ laws that Taliban supporters would like to see (like banning music, films and forcing women to stay at home in veils or strict penal laws) the moderate ulema would be utilised to convince them that they should try to ‘educate’ Muslims about the need for these laws so that a majority votes for parties willing to carry out these changes. If they can’t they should simply try to reform individuals and groups rather than raise arms against the state. All these points can be made with reference to the Quran, Sunnah and opinions of the Imams and ulema whom they respect.

No doubt some of these things might be easier said than done, and others might open up a Pandora’s box of new problems. Yet I am certain we will find no solution to our problems by ignoring the danger posed by the extremists and pretending that all the terrorists are CIA or RAW agents. Nor can we close our eyes to the hatred generated by our docility before the American aggression and its role in motivating poor, illiterate and impressionable young people to fight against their own country.

If we remain true to our principles of unity (seeking reconciliation with all reconcilable Pakistanis not least the tribals) faith (seeking to implement the Islamic provisions of the constititution) and discipline (imposing the writ of the state from a position of strength) we can and we will inshallah, save Pakistan and begin the process of creating that ‘Other Pakistan’ the Quaid’s Pakistan.

March’s B-side has a key focus on Pakistan-US-Afghanistan policy with alternative futures discussed. March’s B-side will be a prelude to April’s B-side which will focus entirely on US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan as by then the NATO Summit will have decided on concrete steps and will be worthy of comprehensive debate and denigration more likely from commentators across the political divide.

March’s B-side contents are:

•    A Race Against Time in Afghanistan by JOHN KERRY
•    The Best Ally Against Extremism by PAULA NEWBERG
•    Pakistan Hone Se Bachao by VARUN GANDHI

The first article is written by the present Chairman of the  US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and former Presidential candidate John Kerry. John Kerry is a respected voice in foreign policy circles and his article will shock readers as it has that unique quality missing till now amongst key American policy makers- words of wisdom.

A Race Against Time in Afghanistan by John F. Kerry

No foreign power has remained welcome in Afghanistan for a sustained period, and the British and the Soviets paid a bitter price for trying. Our goal has never been to dominate Afghanistan but, rather, to eliminate al-Qaeda’s haven and to empower Afghans to govern their country in line with their best interests and our national security.

We shouldn’t delude ourselves into thinking that we are in anything but a race against time in a region suspicious of foreign footprints. The United States is not in Afghanistan to make it our 51st state — but to make sure it does not become an al-Qaeda narco-state and terrorist beachhead capable of destabilizing neighboring Pakistan.

We must renew our original mission — and President Obama has rightly pledged to recommit to Afghanistan as the center of our global counterinsurgency campaign, beginning with the deployment of as many as 30,000 additional troops. In 2006, I argued that more troops were needed. I still believe that. But troops alone will not bring victory. Our military commitment must be matched with realistic goals, beginning with a comprehensive new bottom-up strategy acknowledging Afghanistan’s history of decentralized governance and recognizing the capabilities of our NATO and Afghan allies.

Last year was the deadliest since we arrived in Afghanistan in 2001. A senior U.S. commander warned recently that “it’s going to get worse before it gets better.” We will succeed only by maintaining bipartisan support and public backing at home and winning back the Afghan people through a sustained commitment of additional civilian personnel, reconstruction funds and diplomatic engagement. Equally important, we need to execute this commitment without raising the stakes and turning Afghanistan once again into a magnet for the world’s jihadists.

Our NATO allies have to shoulder a bigger burden, and we should continue to seek more combat troops with fewer restrictions. Jawboning reluctant allies has its limits; we will need to persuade countries unwilling to take on expanded combat roles to contribute more toward other aspects of the mission, including development and police training.

Afghanistan is not Iraq, and we should not expect the same results from a troop increase as occurred in Iraq. There, a broad Sunni tribal awakening was crucial. In Afghanistan, decades of war have weakened tribal structures, and the Taliban — unlike the brutal foreigners who comprise al-Qaeda in Iraq — have deep roots in Pashtun society. More troops, however, can create the conditions for enhanced reconstruction efforts and increase our leverage for the political solution sought by Gen. David Petraeus. Over time, increasing the number of reliable Afghan forces will be vital to maintaining security.

Corruption remains a powerful obstacle to progress. President Hamid Karzai promises to get tough on this chronic problem. But we need to insist on results — where more is given in blood and money, more is expected in return. Afghanistan lacks judges, lawyers and an effective and honest police force. An illegitimate and isolated central government in Kabul would doom our efforts and drive the people into the clutches of the Taliban. We need to expand our reach beyond Kabul, empowering women and working more closely with trusted provincial leaders to ensure that funds reach the people.

Real progress must start at the local level. One promising model is the National Solidarity Program, which employs Afghans in reconstruction projects requested by village elders. A similar approach in Wardak province helps the district government hire tribal members as community guards.

One of our biggest challenges is eradicating narcotics cultivation, a major source of financing for the Taliban. We need to provide greater subsidies and technical assistance for farmers who abandon poppies, as we have done in Nangahar province. But we must also crack down on drug lords and reduce production, employing sustained force when necessary — particularly in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand province.

Our strategy must also reflect the interconnectedness of the region. This requires redoubled efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s civilian government and support its efforts against militants in the lawless border areas and the factions that would sabotage its relations with India.

We went to Afghanistan to deny sanctuary to al-Qaeda and to replace the Taliban rulers who harbored it with a legitimate government strong enough to avoid destabilizing a vital and volatile region. Our goal hasn’t changed. Achieving it requires a more robust commitment of coalition troops and reconstruction aid. It is not too late to turn the tide, but only a comprehensive strategy, sufficient resources and bipartisan resolve will lead to success in Afghanistan.

The writer, a Democrat from Massachusetts, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Published in The Washington Post

WASIM VIEW- John Kerry’s article is full of no-brainers. John Kerry is right in reminding us all that America has been the graveyard of foreign occupiers like the British, Soviet and American too I believe should they remain any longer.

Kerry’s choice of words are indicative when he warns that the US should not ‘delude ourselves into thinking that we are in anything but a race against time in a region of suspicious of foreign footprints’. The race analogy is quite apt as the Afghan people including the Taliban are very much long distance runners in this duel up against an American and NATO presence only equipped for a sprint at best.

John Kerry is no dove and not a new kid on the block either. Kerry is only too right in his words of warning that the war in Afghanistan runs the risk of destabilising Pakistan. In that context the new Obama strategy of dollars for drones is never going to be the answer, and is akin to fiddling while Pakistan burns.

The second article by  Paula Newberg proves that US  policymakers are not all neo-cons and that good sense exists and can even prevail in the States.

The Best Ally Against Extremism by Paula R Newberg

Last week, Pakistan turned its political clock back to the year 2007. Its lawyers’ movement forced President Asif Ali Zardari to reinstate judges dismissed by his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf. After many broken promises and nasty personal politics, Pakistanis now confront the same governance problems that dogged them in the waning days of Musharraf’s rule.

This may not seem like progress. But the fact that the courts can now hold government to account is an enormous step for a state engulfed by terror and fear. Just as the United States is ready to unveil a new strategy for the region, Pakistan may finally begin to marshal a democratic response toward the Taliban and Al Qaeda that neither Islamabad nor Kabul could muster until now.

Why should a domestic dispute matter to the US-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda? Politics and a deep need for justice. The Supreme Court can certainly make life uncomfortable for Zardari, whose tenure is coloured by allegations of his corruption and the shadow of Musharraf’s policies. Before the dismissals, the Supreme Court was prepared to take up contentious cases concerning the security and intelligence services, the disappearance of hundreds of Pakistanis swept up in anti-terrorism campaigns and US rendition practices, Musharraf’s abuse of presidential powers to support US policies and state corruption.

Were the court to rule now, these cases could alter the balance of power within Pakistan and the direction of its foreign policy. Each also strikes at the heart of Pakistan’s misled governance. The courts will undoubtedly keep a close eye on diminishing parliamentary prerogatives and rising presidential powers as Pakistan wades into the new depths of the American-led war. This time around, the United States may have to deal with Pakistan, and if it were smart, Afghanistan, on terms set, at least in part, in the region itself.

The most pressing issue is negotiating with insurgents. The Taliban’s strength lies in border regions, but this is not a peripheral problem. Zardari’s decision to reach an agreement with them in the Swat valley – exchanging peace for the imposition of Islamic law – has infuriated Pakistanis who believe it trades constitutional principle for tactical expediency, and land for peace, bringing militancy close to the heartland without regard to public opinion.

The idea that there is a “moderate” Taliban has circulated since the movement’s rise in the 1990s, when the government of Pakistan formally recognised and international organisations engaged with its members in order to secure humanitarian supplies for Afghanistan. Who these moderates are, and how strong they might be, remains hazy.

Then, as now, even limited talks with the Taliban raised fears that talking conferred legitimacy. And then, as now, negotiation was a quick fix without a clear sense of its consequences for the future of either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto did little to stop the Taliban, her successor Nawaz Sharif gave them formal sanction, Musharraf and Zardari treated them as bargaining partners – and today the Taliban’s rise has raised anew the question of Sharif’s claim to a close relationship with those the US has spent seven years trying to destroy.

None of these efforts diminished the Taliban’s terror campaign, and attempts to cope with this challenge by acceding to its demands raise serious questions about the country’s future. Some Pakistani terror victims now ask if negotiation with insurgents might turn out to have been the right course. Others worry that such bargains might end Pakistan as they know it. All worry about the government’s alliance with the US, including its tacit permission for pilot-less drone attacks against insurgents inside Pakistan that undercuts its sovereignty and political legitimacy.

These are not questions about military decisions, but about political judgment, and affect the kind of political society that Pakistan can become. While the US debates Zardari’s utility, it’s worth remembering that neither Pakistan’s nor Afghanistan’s president has, or should have, sole authority to decide these questions. In both countries, much-ignored parliaments and courts have constitutional roles that could ease the future of future decisions for the region and foreign powers alike.

Like so many questions about legitimacy in a purportedly democratic state, these turn out to be about popular franchise. One year ago, Pakistanis voted against the parties and politicians who wanted to fight terrorism with authoritarian tools – an implied vote against both the Taliban and military decision-making. Now that Zardari has backed down and restored the authority of the judiciary, many Pakistanis are likely to hope that their government will think much harder about the consequences of handing territory and political power to anti-state insurgents.

The same can be said for Afghanistan, where an election is slated for later this year. Its security environment differs from Pakistan’s even if its enemies appear similar. The country’s history with its own Taliban and the profound weakness of the Afghan state may lead Kabul and Islamabad to take different decisions. The Karzai government allowed talks with the Taliban for several years when the US didn’t want them and continues them now, perhaps with US sanction. Few in Afghanistan have complained.

The primary lesson remains a critical one: Afghans need confidence in their own government, in its decisions about war and, ultimately, peace. Their votes need to be respected within the country and outside – not only when they suit the US and its allies.

Politicians don’t always take the right military decisions; neither do military leaders. The problems that trouble Afghanistan and Pakistan today began politically and remain political. Those politics are not solely national. Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to host transnational groups like Al Qaeda and cross-border movements like the Taliban.

But the region’s travails are both a cause and a consequence of long-standing problems of governance. Terror is not an overlay, but a part of the governance environments of both states, and will not disappear until each state can govern itself fully, representatively and justly. This is not about buying allegiance or manufacturing aid projects to stem extremism – it is about the legitimacy of political leaders and institutions.

The US has difficulty reconciling democracy with foreign policy in this region. It pushed Pakistan to send troops into the tribal areas to fight Al Qaeda, gained permission to fight directly on Pakistani soil and merged anti-insurgency activities across the Durand Line – all without the support of the Pakistani electorate.

In Afghanistan, the US and NATO control a war on the territory of an otherwise sovereign state whose elected leader has virtually no say in its conduct and, when he finally complained publicly, was derided by Washington.

This is one way the Obama administration’s policies can stem the tide of failure in the region: by ensuring that its own policies are supported in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not just by officers, presidents and technical experts, but by the electorates themselves. Only then can both countries can take hard decisions and hold them as their own. It’s called democracy, and deserves a chance. -yaleglobal

Paula R Newberg is the Marshall B Coyne Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University

Published in the Daily Times

WASIM VIEW- Paula Newberg’s article is a refreshing read as its full of  that elusive beast missing in Pakistan- good news. The article is the equivalent of an oasis of hope against a sea of pessimism in terms of recent news stories in Pakistan and is the first that has championed the lawyers movement and their struggle namely ‘that the courts can now hold government to account is an enormous step for a state engulfed by terror and fear.

Later in the article, Newberg highlights the folly of present US and NATO policy in the region. Indeed who can doubt that US Afghanistan policy was and still is dreamed up and executed by leaders living in the comfort of their drawing rooms and power corridors  be it in Washington, London, Kabul, Islamabad and is bereft of public backing in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The masses or electorate in Pakistan and Afghanistan must own the war conducted in their name via Parliament and other institutions is Newberg’s central point. The one-man show of Musharraf yesterday, Zardari today and whoever tomorrow is  doomed to fail.

As I said before dollars for drones is not the answer Mr Obama and this is not the change Pakistan can believe in. Indeed President Obama needs to think again his Afghanistan policy and work to formulate a respectable and regionally negotiated US withdrawal that secures US interests in the region. Ignoring such advice promises only defeat and ignomy- Vietnam style.

I finish with  a video clip showing up Varun Gandhi whose recent hate speech included a warning to his Hindu extremist supporters about Indian Muslims ’Pakistan hone se bachao’. I have chose to include the video, not to give oxygen to sickos like Varun Gandhi but as a reminder this March on why the dream of Pakistan was dreamt in 1940, namely to rid the Muslims of India from Hindu hegemony. Thank you Varun Gandhi for proving Pakistan was right.

Pakistan Hone Se Bachao by Varun Gandhi

Varun Gandhi’s communal remarks against Muslims and Sikhs have landed him in jail and created a furore in not so shining India and the wider region. The following video from an Indian media outlet shows the up till now forgotten fakir both naked and bare:

In addition to the video clip, Indian Express has published excerpts from the speeche with translation and they are shown below:

•    Yeh panja nahi hai, yeh kamal ka haath hai. Yeh kat** ke galey ko kaat dega chunaav ke baad. Jai Shri Ram! Ram ji ki jai! Varun Gandhi kaat daalega! Kaat denge us haath ko, kaat denge, kaat daalega! This is not the (Congress symbol) ‘hand’, this is the hand of the ‘lotus’. It will cut the throat of the (derogatory reference to a Muslim) after the elections… Varun Gandhi will cut… Cut that hand, cut it, cut it.
•   Apne jao, apne gaon mein jao aur halla karo ki saara Hindu ek tarfa ho jao, chhetra ko Pakistan hone se bachao, aur saara Hindu ek tarfa ho jao! Go to your villages and give the call that all Hindus must unite to save this area from becoming Pakistan..
•   Kya yeh sach nahin hai… ki usko bola gaya ki mataji aapka naam kya hai… agar usne bola ki Bimla Devi, to usko kahaa ki dekhenge, sochenge… pehle paanch hazaar rupaye do… aur agar uska naam hai Saira Bano ya jo bhi Begum Hukum Begum… hum to jaante nahin hain… badey daraawne naam hotey hain inke… Karimullah… Mazharullah…. agar raat ko kabhi dikh jaayen… to darr rahen hain…Is it not true… that if (a woman) is asked her name and she says Bimla Devi, she is told we’ll see, we’ll think (about giving Government aid), give us Rs 5,000 first… But if her name is Saira Bano or whatever begum Hukum Begum… I don’t even know… These people have such scary-sounding names… Karimullah, Mazharullah… If you ever encountered them at night, you’d be scared…
•   Meri ek behan hai… to ek pamphlet chhapa tha jisme saare pratiyashiyon ka picture likha hua hai… toh meri behan… us bitiya ne kaha… Bhaiya mujhe nahi pata tha ki aapke chhetra mein Osama bin Laden chunaav lad rahein hain… Maine kaha beta Osama bin Laden ko to America pakad nahi liya lekin Varun Gandhi ke to pakad mein bahut aane waale hain chunaav ke baad! I have a sister… there was a pamphlet with pictures of all the candidates… so this child told me, ‘I didn’t know that Osama bin Laden is contesting from your area.’ I told her, ‘America couldn’t get Oma, but Varun Gandhi is going to get a lot of people after the elections.’

WASIM VIEW- As I said at the start, I thank Varun Gandhi for proving Pakistan was right in demanding partition and freedom from Hindu hegemony. I feel I need not say anymore as this is a case where the less said is the more said.